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Abstract
This paper is a critical review of the most relevant studies about the Levinasian concept of passivity. The purpose 
is to follow the way in which Levinas’s scholars have dealt with the following aspects: the relation between ethical 
passivity and the possibility of effective ethical agency, the origin of passivity, and the validity of ethical passivity 
in the public sphere. As a starting point for future research, i finally argue that the best way to read Levinas’s 
passive ethics is through the dynamism between maximums and minimums present within it. This means that 
without sacrificing the omni comprehensive view of divine revelation and Jewish tradition, Levinas presents 
ethics as rationally understandable by everyone and philosophically defensible. despite being biblically based, 
Levinas does not appeal to authority in supporting his view, he is confident in arguing rationally. This account 
could place Levinas in the way of public ethics, which consists in an ethos shared by all members of democratic 
societies. These minimums of justice could be the way to universalize Levinas’s ethics.
Keywords: Levinas, ethics, passivity, maximums, minimums.
Resumen
El presente artículo es una revisión crítica de los más importantes estudios sobre el concepto levinasiano de 
pasividad. El propósito del mismo es seguir el camino a través del cual estos estudios han tratado los siguientes 
aspectos: la relación entre pasividad ética y la posibilidad real de una efectiva agencia ética, el origen de la 
pasividad y la validez de la pasividad ética en la esfera pública. Finalmente planteo, como principio para una 
subsecuente investigación, que el mejor camino para leer el concepto de pasividad en Levinas es a través del 
dinamismo entre máximos y mínimos presentes en él. Esto significa que sin sacrificar la visión omnicompren-
siva de la revelación divina y la tradición judía, Levinas presenta la ética como racionalmente entendible por 
todos y defendible filosóficamente. A pesar de estar basada en la Biblia, Levinas no recurre a ninguna autoridad 
dogmática para justificar su visión. Él está confiado en argumentar racionalmente. Esta perspectiva puede 
poner a Levinas en la línea de la ética civil que consiste en un ethos compartido por todos los miembros de las 
sociedades democráticas. Lo mínimos de justicia puede ser el camino para universalizar la ética de Levinas.
Palabras clave: Levinas, ética, pasividad, máximos, mínimos.
Resumo
Este artigo é uma revisão crítica dos estudos mais importantes sobre o conceito Levinasiano de passividade. 
o objetivo do mesmo é seguir o caminho através do qual estes estudos têm abordado as seguintes questões: a 
relação entre passividade ética e a possibilidade real de uma eficaz agência de ética, a origem de passividade e a 
validade da passividade ética na esfera pública. Finalmente esboço como princípio para uma pesquisa posterior, 
que a melhor maneira de ler o conceito de passividade em Levinas é através do dinamismo entre máximos e 
mínimos presentes nele. isto significa que, sem sacrificar a visão abrangente da revelação divina e da tradição 
judaica, Levinas apresenta a ética como racionalmente compreensível por todos e filosoficamente defensável. 
Apesar de ser baseada na Bíblia, Levinas não recorre a nenhuma autoridade dogmática para justificar sua visão. 
Ele está confiado em argumentar racionalmente. Essa perspectiva pode colocar a Levinas na linha da ética civil, 
que consiste em um ethos compartilhado por todos os membros das sociedades democráticas. o mínimo de 
justiça pode ser o caminho para universalizar a ética de Levinas.
Palavras-chave: Levinas, ética, passividade, máximos, mínimos.
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Introducción
According to an established tradition, 
only free acts and their consequences are 
relevant from an ethical standpoint. only 
a free human being can aspire to a better 
life and look for the ways to accomplish 
it. This timeless aspiration to happiness 
goes through history looking for the best 
system that unveils the “secret” of a good 
life. From the Aristotelian Thomistic tradi-
tion to the modern and contemporary, and 
irrespective of their different historical and 
philosophical backgrounds, philosophers 
are confident in the capacity of humans 
to actively find the best solution for the 
challenging question about how to live 
as rational beings in a shared world. in 
this regard, the coexistence of different 
beliefs and ways of conceiving the ideal 
of a good life are the main characteristics 
of contemporary societies. For this rea-
son, contemporary ethical and political 
reflection has a great interest in the com-
mon substrate of values that integrates 
the different world-views regardless of 
cultural differences.
Emmanuel Levinas appears on the philo-
sophical scene challenging the conception 
of ethical agency as freedom of choice, 
introducing radical passivity as the way to 
authentically live as humans, and pointing 
out an ethic with a distinctly religious 
language. For Levinas, the term “subject” 
must be understood in the sense of the 
passive participle: subject as subjected or 
dependent on someone (the other). Sub-
jectivity is not subject in the grammatical 
sense: it is not the “i” that accompanies 
all my actions. The first-person pronoun 
can only refer to the subject when it is 
conjugated in the accusative. The passivity 
of the subject is not the nonexercise of 
freedom, as it is voluntary. it is passivity 
prior to any freedom.
Secondary literature on Levinas’s thinking 
has highlighted some concrete problems. 
Questions arise about how passivity can 
be the source of actions and ethical deci-
sion-making: how we can put aside the care 
of ourselves and be bound or subjected 
to respond for the other; thus, what is the 
ethical relevance of an action not chosen 
but imposed? (Hofmeyr, 2009a, p. 1).
Related to these concerns, i wonder if it 
is possible that this perspective of ethics, 
defined by Levinas as religion and rooted 
in a subject that appears always responding 
to a previous call from an immemorial 
and anarchic time, can be of relevance in 
democratic, religiously pluralistic and cul-
turally diverse societies. in these societies, 
religious monism as an instrument of moral 
control has lost influence, and law and civil 
ethics are the most important regulators 
of behaviour. Ethics of liberal societies is 
premised on consensus among citizens 
about the minimum level of justice that 
allows them to live peacefully where there 
are diverse ways to comprehend the ideal 
of a good life. After all, we live in a world 
in which we inevitably have to deal with 
discourse, adaptation, comprehension, 
and history.
This review will trace the origin of ethi-
cal passivity, and from there it will ask 
whether Levinas’s account of ethics can 
be universalised beyond Jewish culture, 
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or whether it is valid only in the Jewish 
believer’s intimate sphere. is this ethics 
socially effective and morally valid? What 
can be the meaning of this ethics for peo-
ple’s everyday life? How can this ethics 
operate in human-to-human contact? 
The concept of chosenness of the Jewish 
people and the continuous references to 
biblical categories in Levinas’s reflection 
and, on the other hand, the necessity of 
a shared ethos to live in pluralistic and 
multicultural societies makes the question 
sensible and meaningful.
in the existent literature, this review will 
develop three aspects: 1. ethical passivity 
and the possibility of an effective ethical 
agency; 2. the origin of passivity, and 3. 
the validity of ethical passivity in the 
public sphere.
Passivity and ethical agency
deficiencies in Levinas’s account of pas-
sivity as a basis for an effective ethical 
agency upon have been pointed out by 
Lingis (2009) and Peperzak (2009). Lingis 
argues that the responsibility assigned to 
the subject to respond for the other, for 
its needs and actions, cannot be the basis 
for an ethical action. if the subject has to 
respond for everyone and everything, this 
makes an effective answer impossible. The 
subject does not have all the resources to 
cover all the necessities of everyone else. 
Furthermore, the recognition of the other 
is because in it appears the face of the 
absolute other, of God, and this puts the 
other in the uncertainty of its situatedness 
because there are infinite demands posed 
by an infinite number of others. Finally, 
according to Lingis, Levinas’s lack of re-
cognition of the things of the world and 
nature which the subject appropriates 
and enjoys, and that require care and 
protection is incomprehensible. in this 
sense, things of the world and animals, for 
example, could be manipulated ignoring 
that they have to be protected.
Lingis’s stance on thinking the encoun-
ter with the other in absolute empirical 
terms is problematic because Levinas, as 
we know, tones down the radicalism of 
the responsibility when the social order 
appears in the face of the other (Levinas 
1969, p. 212; 1991, p. 157). in this sense, 
Bernasconi argues that behind Levinas’s 
contention of passivity are the conditions 
of possibility of ethics; but, on the other 
hand, recognises that this encounter can 
happen in real life (Bernasconi 2002). in 
Bernasconi’s assertion is reflected Levinas’s 
proposal of thinking about ethics as the 
reference level from which the real world 
has to be criticized (Levinas 1969, p. 80).
distinguishing in Levinas’s works between 
the passivity of the world of enjoyment that 
appears in Totality and Infinity and the ab-
solute passivity before the call of the other 
in Otherwise than Being, Peperzak shows 
how welcome and recognition of the other 
is impossible in the world of enjoyment 
to which the subject remains addicted 
(Peperzak, 2009). This is the relative 
passivity of the addiction to the world of 
consumption. Therefore, it is necessary to 
open up space to an absolute passivity in 
which the subject welcomes and responds 
for the other. However, it is unclear, for 
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Peperzak, how the subject can take care 
of the other without taking care of itself, 
in such a way that it is not the passivity 
of the rock or the machine. Peperzak is 
in favour of accepting the need of the 
subject’s improvement to respond appro-
priately to the requirements of the other.
Unlike Lingis, Peperzak contends that 
Levinas’s ethical language does not co-
rrespond to empirical experiences but is 
pre o meta-logic. it describes a situation 
of responsibility that precedes every 
ethics (Peperzak, 1993, p. 223). despite 
the differences of the radicalism of the 
critics, both, Lingis and Peperzak, agree 
on considering the impossibility of ethical 
action from the subject’s passivity.
Against this framing, some scholars accept 
the possibility of basing ethical agency as 
a horizon of meaning of concrete ethical 
actions rather than considering passivity 
in empirical terms (Bernasconi 2002; 
Morgan 2011; Zeillinger 2009). in this 
line of thinking, Morgan’s historical and 
phenomenological analysis conceives 
Levinas’s concept of passivity as part 
of the twentieth-century debate about 
the subject’s autonomy, individuality, 
and freedom (Morgan 2011, p. 115-19). 
According to Morgan, Levinas places his 
account of subject in the debate about the 
primacy of the self, and the criticism of the 
individual’s capacity for self-knowledge 
and autonomy. in this respect, Bernas-
coni states that Levinas takes ethics out 
of the traditional frame of philosophy, 
having three targets in mind: overcoming 
Hobbesian egoism, responding to the 
Heideggerian concern for own existence 
and rejecting the traditional conceptions 
of ethics rooted in freedom (2002, p. 239). 
The final contention of both Morgan’ and 
Bernasconi’ is that Levinas’s purpose with 
the concept of passivity is to clarify what 
the subject must be like for the everyday 
experience to be meaningful. The same 
conclusion is drawn by Zeillinger affirming 
that Levinas merely wants to account for 
the possibility of sacrifice for the other 
and not “that one should sacrifice oneself” 
(2009, p. 107). in other words, Levinas’s 
use of ethical language can be understood 
as a search for the conditions of compre-
hension of ethics, and responds to the 
meaning of ethical concrete situations.
Roots of passivity 
The exploration of the concept of passivity 
in phenomenological sources has followed 
in the footsteps of Jean Wahl (Hofmeyr 
2009b) and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (Ber-
go 2009). According to Hofmeyr, Wahl 
conceives the relation between the self 
and the other in a double movement, 
trans-ascendant and trans-descendant. The 
trans-ascendant is a movement towards 
the other propelled by an infinite desire. 
This is the encounter with the other that 
puts the idea of infinity into the self, 
affecting its egoistical preoccupations. The 
trans-descendant, on the other hand, is 
a downward movement into the subject 
itself. While the first one paradoxically 
leaves the subject in the immanence, 
the trans-descendant movement allows 
the subject to discover something that 
has not been there before the encounter 
with the other: the idea of infinity which 
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is prior to autonomy and leads us to find 
something that has always already been 
there, the other-in-the-same. in being the 
subject subjected to the other-in-the-sa-
me, ethical agency lies in “inner force 
that incapacitates freedom, understood 
as involuntarily egoistical” (Hofmeyr, 
2009, p. 28). Therefore, passivity stems 
from this intertwining between upward 
and downward movements in which the 
subject discovers itself inevitably tied to 
the other to whom and for whom the 
subject must be responsible.
The exploration of the phenomenological 
roots of Levinas’s concept of passivity 
takes a different path with Bettina Bergo. 
She performs an analysis comparing 
Levinas and Merleau-Ponty’s accounts 
of passivity, showing common interests 
and divergences. According to
Bergo, both Levinas and Merleau-Ponty 
draw on “Edmund Husserl’s work on 
passive synthesis, from the conscious-
ness of internal time to association, and 
attempt to outline the conditions under 
which passivity can be approached”, 
fully aware that a thematization of 
passivity will reinsert it into intentional 
consciousness, thereby re-establishing 
its dualism with activity (Bergo, 2009, 
p. 31). The condition of phenomenolo-
gical priority of passivity is recognised 
by Bergo as do almost all readers of 
Levinas. This means the other-in-the-
same is “undergone passively before it 
is represented” (2009, p. 31).
Going a step further, Bergo incorpora-
tes the symbolism of Merleau-Ponty’s 
dreams to weaken the standard readings 
of Levinas’s status of the world and 
immanence in later phenomenology. 
The objective world, meaning everyday 
thinking and activities, never makes 
sense in Otherwise than Being. Hyperbolic 
concepts like substitution could be best 
understood as a modality of perception 
“possibly akin to falling sleep or to 
Merleau-Ponty’s sense of dreaming, in 
which the other becomes all, in which 
the posited ‘i’, the body-subject, be-
longs to a field crossed by other fields 
or other “others” (Bergo, 2009, p. 51). 
Passivity is rooted in intersubjectivity 
that presupposes bodily existence and 
flesh. According to Bergo, passivity in 
Levinas is sensuous because it pursues 
intersubjectivity, and this pre-supposes 
the third party, not solely the face-to-face 
relation with the other.
despite what Hofmeyr’s and Bergo’s 
studies suggest, it is essential for this 
research to trace the religious route to 
passivity (Anckaert, 2009; Fagenblat, 
2010; Topolsky, 2009). in this sense, 
Fagenblat affirms that the best way to 
understand Levinas is by tracing the 
biblical and rabbinical roots Levinas 
uses for philosophical purposes; that is, 
without religious intentions but rather by 
secularizing them. By interpreting Levinas 
as a hermeneutical thinker, Fagenblat 
wants to save Levinas from the charge 
of dogmatism and discover the value of 
Judaism for phenomenological inquiry. 
Levinas would philosophize from the 
Jewish textual tradition while construc-
ting a phenomenological interpretation 
of Judaism (Fagenblat, 2010).
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To demonstrate, Fagenblat points out 
that Levinas’s major philosophical works, 
Totality and Infinity and Otherwise than 
Being or Beyond Essence, are “midrashically 
determined from beginning to end”, and 
specifically an ethical response to evil 
(Fagenblat, 2010, p. xxiii). According 
to Fagenblat, passivity comes to light in 
Otherwise than Being and is one characte-
ristic among several that demonstrates the 
depth of the change undergone by Levinas 
in his second great work. in Totality and 
Infinity, ethics is grounded in a created 
world from chaos in the image of God, in 
which a separated subject responds to the 
face of the other; however, in Otherwise 
than Being, the emphasis is on the moral 
creature subjected to the other and bound 
to respond for it (Fagenblat, 2010, pp. 
101- 106). in this sense, while in Totality 
and Infinity Levinas uses a metaphysical 
theology, in Otherwise than Being he uses 
a nonmetaphysical secularized theology.
Anckaert (2009), for his part, analyses 
Levinas’s Talmudic commentary And God 
Created Woman to argue that the concept 
of creation in this text has a twofold 
meaning, linguistically expressed by the 
duplication of the verb “to create” in 
Genesis 2:22: creation ex-nichilo, and 
creation of the man and of the woman. 
in the first creation, man is put under 
God’s gaze in total exposure and in the 
second, being human is found to have an 
unconditional responsibility. This respon-
sibility stems from the fact that the human 
being receives the whole world created 
after it as a mandate, therefore, making it 
responsible for something that it has not 
done. While Fagenblat sees passivity as a 
characteristic born in Otherwise than Being 
and, therefore, outside of the concept of 
creation in the image of God, Anckaert 
states that passivity stems from the twofold 
meaning of creation in Genesis.
Understanding passivity from the con-
cept of creation as Anckaert does is 
problematic.
Before him, some Levinas’s readers have 
also expressed the importance of the 
concept of creation in Levinas’s account 
of ethics (Gaviria Alvarez, 1974; Margaria 
2005; Petrosino, 1995). Nevertheless, i 
considerer that this concept to Levinas 
would have some negative consequences: 
the ontologization of God, considered as 
first cause; exclusion of the separation 
and self-sufficiency inherent to human 
existence (which would be a divine poie-
sis); and ontologization of the man-God 
bond, displaced from the salvific plane to 
the cosmic one.
Close to Fagenblat, Topolsky (2009) argues 
that Levinas’s work can be understood 
by taking seriously the philosophical 
and Talmudic sources of his thinking to 
understand a typical Jewish philosophy. 
By coining the expression “Judeosophy”, 
Topolsky characterises the way in which 
Levinas integrates biblical and rabbinic 
teachings in his philosophical thinking. 
Levinas’s philosophy cannot be adequately 
understood if any of the sources of his 
thinking is excluded. it is not Jerusalem 
or Athens but both, Jerusalem and Athens. 
in this sense, Richard Cohen contends that 
the unique difference between Levinas’s 
philosophical and religious discourses 
lies in the audience to which they are 
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addressed and not in the message that 
Levinas is transmitting (Cohen, 2010, p. 
200). According to Topolsky, to unders-
tand the concept of passivity and ethics, 
in general, it is necessary to considerer 
the biblical concepts of face, “here I am” 
and God. The concept of face, panim, 
refers us to the concept of the hostage. 
Similarly, the concept of response, hine-
ni, translated as “here i am”, helps us to 
grasp responsibility prior to freedom, a 
freedom not chosen but imposed. Finally, 
in this relationship, the trace of God is 
experienced as an infinite responsibility, 
for which, according to Levinas, “i carry 
the weight of the world” (Banon, Levinas 
& Ricoeur, 1998, p. 25).
Topolsky’s reading of Levinas is a very 
interesting one, but her view requires a 
further explanation of the consequences 
of the concepts of face, response and God. 
My contention is that passivity stems 
from the concept of revelation that is an 
act of speech and is fundamentally an 
order or mandate. Jewish revelation is 
based on prescription. The attitude of 
the person receiving revelation is obe-
dience (Levinas, 1996, p. 206), and this 
obedience, according to Levinas, comes 
from a love of neighbour, a love obeyed, 
lacking self-indulgence. This love is res-
ponsibility for the neighbour, the taking 
upon oneself of the destiny of the other, 
or fraternity. An effective, ethical action 
from responsibility before freedom is the 
consequence of the obedience to revela-
tion. Therefore, passivity is neither Lingis’s 
lack of resources nor Peperzak’s lack of 
care for itself, but passivity non-satisfied, 
passivity as a formal level of ethical action 
and non-satisfied because as Levinas says 
“the other concerns me in all his material 
misery” (Levinas, 2001, p. 52).
Levinas recognises the problem of justi-
fying revelation from reason rather than 
solely from faith. is it possible to break the 
closed circle of totality and its correlative, 
the self-sufficient reason? if at least this 
break were thinkable, “the main part of 
the problem would be solved”, according 
to Levinas (1996, p. 205). He wonders if 
there might be another way, different to 
rationality, through which we base our 
possibilities to comprehend the world. 
Levinas is confident in showing the rich-
ness and sufficiency of a passive subject 
who does not relate to the other through 
cognitive intentionality but through the 
richness of “the explosion of the ‘the more 
within the less’ which descartes called 
the idea of infinity, and demonstrates a 
psyche which is more alert than that of 
intentionality, or a knowledge adequate to 
its object” (1996, p. 208). For Levinas, a 
passive ethics, obedient to the divine com-
mandment and responsible for the other, 
shows a greater richness of meaning than 
the closed rationality of the subject. After 
all, ethics is not lucidity but responsibility.
Unlike Fagenblat, it is my contention that 
Levinas’s ethics is showing an absolute, 
which, nonetheless, does not prevent him 
from attempting a reasonable presenta-
tion without appealing to any revealed 
authority. By showing that Levinas does 
not take into account the concepts of 
peoplehood and law, Fagenblat wants 
to save Levinas from the accusation of 
dogmatism (Fagenblat, 2011). i consider, 
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however, that Levinas’s account of law is 
essential to comprehend ethical passivity. 
This means, in my view, the presence in 
his ethical opus of omnicomprehensive 
maximums of Jewish culture and faith 
and, at the same time, minimums with 
a vocation of universalisation.
Secular or religious ethics?
opening up the question of religion, we 
run into the possibility of viewing Levinas’s 
ethics as a dogmatic account of Judaic 
particularism of revelation, or, on the other 
hand, the possibility of universalisation 
through the rational account of shared 
ethos beyond Levinas’s Jewish-cultural 
background. in the first possibility, we find 
dominique Janicaud (2000) who believes 
that Levinas uses the language of the phe-
nomenology to turn theologically towards 
the invisible, so his ethics is valid only for 
those who share the same religious tradi-
tion. The rationale is subordinated to the 
religious, to the revelation of the invisible 
face for which the subject is responsible 
prior to any personal decision. According 
to Janicaud, this approach necessarily 
refers to an authority beyond reason and, 
therefore, non-philosophical. The same 
suspicion about the dogmatic character of 
Levinas’s philosophy is shared by Gillian 
Rose (1993), Judith Butler (2000) and 
Alain Badiou (2002) who contend that 
it is an expression of a dogmatism that 
has its source in revelation. With a more 
positive attitude towards Levinas, Ajzenstar 
(2001) shares Fagenblat and Topolsky’s 
contentions about the essential Jewish 
nature of Levinas’s work, but acknowledges 
the difficulties in philosophically justifying 
Levinasian ethics, and, therefore, its limited 
usefulness in the social sphere. Levinas’s 
account of ethics will be useful in the pri-
vate codes sphere of the religious person, 
but without pretensions of universality.
opportunities to open channels of com-
munication with other “theologies” from 
the Levinasian perspective of ethics have 
been considered by other scholars (Co-
hen, 2010, Urbano, 2012). By reading 
Levinasian monotheism ethically and not 
epistemologically a dialogue is possible 
between religions, according to Cohen 
(2010). These lines of communication 
between people, more than simply be-
tween ideas, would discover values of 
interhuman kindness and fairness that 
enable interchange and interhuman un-
derstanding. According to Cohen, the 
demand to put the other first and the call to 
justice for everyone are two concepts that 
can contribute to overcoming the clashes 
among religions. it is the consequence 
to start human relations from the saying 
and not from the said as said (2010, pp. 
224-54). Cohen’s claim is coherent with 
his reading of Levinas’s philosophy, where, 
as stated above, he does not find essential 
differences between Levinas’s religious 
and philosophical writings. in this line 
of thinking, Urbano (2012) analyses the 
possibility of an interfaith dialogue on 
the basis of Levinas’s proposal. Recogni-
zing that Levinas does not give concrete 
guidelines for dialogue but conditions of 
possibility, Urbano states that from Levinas 
can be drawn an ethical encounter more 
than an objective discourse. Both, Cohen 
and Urbano, place Levinas in dialogue with 
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other religions to overcome differences and 
reach understandings between them. The 
question, nonetheless, remains in terms 
of possibilities of universalisation beyond 
Judaism to build democratic societies 
beyond “theologies”.
Conclusion 
Concerning the validity of Levinas´s 
religious perspective in the public sphe-
re, i claim that the best way to read his 
ethical passivity is through the dynamism 
between maximums and minimums 
present within it. This means that wi-
thout sacrificing the omnicomprehensive 
view of divine revelation and Jewish 
tradition, Levinas presents ethics as ra-
tionally understandable by everyone and 
philosophically defensible. despite being 
biblically based, Levinas does not appeal 
to authority in supporting his view; he 
is confident in arguing rationally. This 
account could place Levinas in the way 
of civil ethics, which consists in an ethos 
shared by all members of democratic so-
cieties. These minimums of justice could 
be the way to universalise Levinas’s ethics.
This reading has several consequences. 
Firstly, justice, for Levinas, has a reli-
gious and philosophical dimension and, 
probably against the same Levinas, phi-
losophical and religious writings should 
be read together to properly appreciate 
ethics. Then, Levinas’s account of ethics 
can be universalised and can be socially 
effective. Finally, ethical agency could be 
understood as an expression of a way of 
humanization that opens up with the 
responsibility for the other and for the 
others who are always present from the 
beginning in the ethical relation. This 
responsibility is comprehensible beyond 
biblical revelation and opens ways of com-
munication between different modes to un-
derstand the Aristotelian ideal of good life.
The idea of ethical maximum and mini-
mum is developed mainly by Spaniard 
philosopher Adela Cortina and for Professor 
Michael Walzer at the American institute 
for Advanced Study. Cortinas’s question is
How it is possible –which remains the 
big question- to design offers of moral 
philosophy, politics and religion that 
make possible the reconciliation of the 
demands of ethical universalism with 
the rich plurality of ethical maximum. 
How it is possible to think and live ade-
quately universal demands for justice 
and invitations to happiness, projects 
with meaning for life and death, roo-
ted in cultures, traditions and diver-
se histories. (Cortina, 2000, p. 11).
According to Cortina, it is necessary to 
build a secular ethics from traditions, belie-
fs, and economic conditions of members of 
society. in short, pluralism of worldviews 
requires a consensus about the minimum 
ethics of a democratic and multicultural 
society. Walzer (1994) appeals to minimal 
and maximal meanings of morality and 
says “we can standardly give thin and thick 
accounts of them, and the two accounts 
are appropriate to different contexts, serve 
different purposes” (p. 2). While the thin 
meaning appears in specific times and 
places and is based on common unders-
tanding of its meaning, the thick meaning 
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is shared in the same language, history, 
religion and politics.
Levinas’s account of passive ethics is sha-
ped as an answer to divine revelation that 
provides values that are philosophically 
comprehensible and, therefore, univer-
salizable. Through Cortina and Walzer, 
it is possible to show how this ethics 
can be read based on the dynamism of 
maximums and minimums, overcoming 
the criticism of dogmatism that has been 
levelled at it. Thus, Levinas provides a 
frame for an ethics valid in civil socie-
ties beyond Jewish particularisms, and 
in this sense, Levinas appears as both 
a Jewish and a universalizing thinker. 
Furthermore, values that come from 
revelation provide the scenario for the 
ethical action in Levinasian philosophy. 
in fact, responsibility as Levinas says “is a 
matter eventually, of nourishing him (the 
other), of clothing him. it is exactly of 
biblical assertion: Feed the hungry clothe 
the naked, give drink to the thirsty, give 
shelter to the shelterless” (2001, p. 52).
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